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"SUITABLE HOME" TESTS UNDER SOCIAL SECURITY:
A FUNCTIONAL APPROACH TO EQUAL
PROTECTION
LEGISLATIVE proposals now being considered" by Congress to overrule a
recent decision by the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare 2 to with-
hold federal funds from states imposing certain eligibility requirements upon
the receipt of benefits under the Social Security Act 3 may compel reexamina-
tion of the scope and meaning of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. Title IV of the Act provides financial assistance to children who
have lost, through death, incapacity or desertion, one or both parents, if the
children are living with the remaining parent or another relative. 4 Further-
more, to insure adequate home care for the child, the Act also authorizes pay-
ments for the sustenance and medical expenses of the parent or relative.5 Fed-
eral payments do not go directly to the children. Rather, appropriated funds
are paid by the Social Security Administration to states; the states through
their welfare agencies then distribute the funds to families qualifying under
state-established criteria.6 To be eligible for federal funds, a state must submit
a plan for aid to dependent children;7 the statute provides thirteen specific
requirements which state plans must meet ;8 if the Secretary is satisfied that
these conditions are fulfilled, he is required to approve the plan.0 Currently, all
states plus three territories and the District of Columbia are receiving funds
under a wide variety of local schemes.10
1. Shortly before publication time, several amendments to Title IV were enacted.
Among these is a provision that the effective date of the Secretary's decision be postponed
until September, 1962, in order to give the states an opportunity to modify the State stat-
utes involved. N.Y. Times, May 9, 1961, § 1, p. 19, col. 4. Should any of the states affected
refuse to modify their programs, Congress would again be faced with the problems and
alternatives discussed in this Note.
2. For the official directive resulting from this decision, see State Letter No. 452, De-
partment of Health, Education and Welfare, Bureau of Public Assistance (Jan. 17, 1961).
3. Social Security Act, Title IV, 49 Stat. 627-29 (1935), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§
601-06 (1958).
4. 49 Stat. 629 (1935), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 606(a) (1958).
5. 49 Stat. 629 (1935), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 606(b) (1958).
6. 49 Stat. 628 (1935), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 603 (1958).
7. 49 Stat. 627 (1935), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1958).
8. Twelve of these are set out in 49 Stat. 627 (1935), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)
(1958). They include requirements that a plan must "(1) provide that it shall be in effect
in all political subdivisions of the State, and, if administered by them, be mandatory upon
them," and "(5) provide such methods of administration... as are found by the Secretary
to be necessary for the proper and efficient operation of the plan," and "(9) provide ...
that all individuals wishing to make application for aid . . .shall have opportunity to do
so, and that aid . . . shall be furnished with reasonable promptness to all eligible in-
dividuals."
9. 49 Stat. 627 (1935), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 602(b) (1958).
10. See 23 SociAL SEcumrry BumL. No. 8, p. 87 (August, 1960).
"SUITABLE HOME" TESTS1
So called "suitable home" provisions, concerned primarily with the conduct
of the parent or guardian, are significant features of twenty five state plans.-1
Under these plans, a home may be declared "unsuitable" for a variety of rea-
sons; the consequences of such a designation take one of two general forms.
Under the majority of these plans, a finding by a state welfare agency that a
home is "unsuitable" results either in provision of additional welfare services
and assistance,1 2 or in removal of the child from the home through legal pro-
ceedings.13 In seven states, however, while classification of a home as "unsuit-
able" requires termination of all benefits to the child, no alternative provision
for its care or support is made.14 Though both types of plan have existed for
several years, enactment of Louisiana's "suitable home" tests last year occa-
sioned an investigation culminating in action by the Secretary. 15 The Louisiana
statutes go beyond most of the earlier enactments in their specific focus on
illegitimacy and the moral conduct of the relative.16 Thus all aid is denied
where the relative with whom the child lives is engaging in illicit cohabitation.
Further, no aid may be given to any child living with its mother, if she has had
an illegitimate child after having received assistance, or to any child, itself
illegitimate, whose mother has had two previous illegitimate children.17 Since
11. Twenty-four of these provisions are summarized in DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDucATIoN
AND WELFARE, ILLEGITIMACY AND ITS IMPACT ON THE Am TO DEPENDENT CHILDRN PRO-
GRAM 72-76 (April, 1960) [hereinafter cited as DEPT. OF H., E. & W. REP.]. The twenty-
fifth state is Louisiana, where "suitable home" provisions were enacted last year. See note
16 infra. In some of these states, "suitable home" tests are prescribed at the administrative
level, and do not appear in the statutes. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. §§ 63-141 (Supp. 1960).
12. See, e.g., discussion of recently enacted Tennessee "suitable home" provisions. Note,
36 NOTRE DAMIE LAW. 56, 60 (1960). Eighteen of the twenty-five plans are of this general
type. See DEPT. OF H., E. & W. REP. 72-75.
13. Note, 36 NOTRE DAME LAw. 56, 60 (1960).
14. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 7171 (Supp. 1958); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 46:233
(Supp. 1960). In the other five states this result is apparently achieved through adminis-
tration rather than explicit statutory directive. See DEPT. OF H., E. & W. REP. 75-76.
15. See note 2 supra. See also Decision of Commissioner of Social Security, The Con-
formity of the Louisiana Plan for Aid to Dependent Children Under Title IV of the Social
Security Act, Dep't of Health, Education and Welfare (Jan. 16, 1961).
16. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 46:233 (Supp. 1960):
A. Assistance may be granted to any dependent child:
(1) Who is living in a suitable family home ... provided, however, that a home
will not be considered suitable in which the parents or other relatives ... are living
together and are not husband and wife by virtue of a marriage recognized as valid
under the laws of this state....
C. In no instance shall assistance be granted to an illegitimate child if the mother
.. . is the mother of two or more older illegitimate children unless it should be
determined that the conception and birth of such child was due to extenuating cir-
cumstances over which the mother had no control....
D. ... [no] assistance shall be granted to any person who is living with his or
her mother, if the mother has had an illegitimate child after a check has been received
from the welfare department unless and until proof satisfactory ... has been pre-
sented showing that the mother has ceased illicit relationships ....
17. Ibid.
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the last requirement applies even if the child is not living with its mother, all
aid may be denied solely on the basis of the mother's past conduct. The enact-
ment of these provisions reduced the number of qualifying children in Louisiana
by almost one-third of the previous total; of those disqualified, nearly all were
non-white.' 8
The Secretary decided that state plans which deny assistance to a child on
the basis of the suitability of its home without removing the child from such
home will no longer qualify for federal assistance. This decision was based on
the ground that such plans impose "a condition of eligibility that bears no just
relationship to the Aid to Dependent Children program."'1 While noting that
his discretion in passing on state plans is limited, and that "reasonable" con-
ditions of eligibility could not be rejected, the Secretary indicated that his func-
tion included interpretation and enforcement of congressional purpose, and con-
cluded that the "suitable home" plans involved not only failed to serve that
purpose, but in fact subverted it.20
It is doubtful whether a state can successfully challenge the Secretary's
order under existing law. The purpose clause 21 and legislative history of Title
IV,2' as well as the construction given the Act in court decisions, 23 all demon-
strate that Congress' overriding goal is to provide financial assistance to de-
pendent children. 24 Taking the Louisiana "suitable home" statutes as a focal
18. Ninety-three per cent of the cases closed, and nearly 95% of the children excluded,
were non-white. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, REVIEW OF PRAcTICE
UNDER THE SUITABILITY OF HOME PoLicy IN Ail TO DEPENDENT CHILDREN IN LOUISIANA
JUNE-OCTOBER 10, 77, 84 (1960).
19. Press Release of the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, Jan. 17,
1961, p. 2.
20. Id. at 1-3.
21. 49 Stat. 627 (1935), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1958):
For the purpose of encouraging the care of dependent children in their own homes
or in the homes of relatives by enabling each State to furnish financial assistance
and other services, as far as practicable under the conditions in such State, to needy
dependent children and the parents or relatives with whom they are living to help
maintain and strengthen family life and to help such parents or relatives to attain
the maximum self-support and personal independence consistent with the mainte-
nance of continuing parental care and protection, there is authorized to be appro-
priated for each fiscal year a sum sufficient to carry out the purposes of this sub-
chapter.
22. S. REP. No. 628, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3, 35 (1935).
23. E.g., State ex rel. Williams v. Kamp, 106 Mont. 444, 78 P.2d 585 (1938); Lietz
v. Flemming, 264 F.2d 311 (6th Cir. 1959) ; Ewing v. Black, 172 F.2d 331 (6th Cir. 1949) ;
General Wayne Inn v. Rothensies, 47 F. SupV. 391 (E.D. Pa. 1942); Sparks v. United
States, 153 F. Supp. 909 (D. Vt. 1957) ; Gonzales v. Hobby, 110 F. Supp. 893 (D. Puerto
Rico 1953).
24. The recent report of the Senate Finance Committee urges that wherever the words
"aid to dependent children" currently appear in the Act, including the title, the words "aid
to families with dependent children" be substituted. S. REP. No. 165, 87th Cong., 1st Sess.
8 (1961). The reason given is the expanded scope of the program's coverage. Conceivably,
however, this could be a first step in a movement to shift the emphasis from the child to
the parent, thus making the conduct of the latter relevant in terms of eligibility.
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point for discussion, since they include all the elements found, individually or
collectively, in the provisions of the other affected states,25 it is difficult to see
how this purpose-financial assistance to children-is promoted by such enact-
ments. The designated beneficiaries of Title IV are children; yet "suitable
home" provisions deny a child benefits which it would otherwise receive solely
because of the actions of persons other than itself. Such statutes do not dis-
tinguish between children on the basis of need--common sense would indicate
that the need of those in "unsuitable" homes may in fact be greater than that
of others 2Q-and while Congress has not included all needy dependent children
in its program, the distinctions it has made can at least be defended on grounds
of administrative expediency and a desire to preserve the family unit,27 a claim
which cannot be made on behalf of the state enactments. Where congressional
legislation has designated a broad class of recipients, courts have construed
specific clauses in such enactments so as to include as many of that class as
possible.28 Certainly Congress intended state plans to be sufficiently flexible to
meet local needs and conditions ;29 certainly federal social security legislation
does not in terms oppose the pursuance by states of their own interests, such
as economy and regulation of immorality ;3o nevertheless, such a policy of con-
gressional deference could not have been intended to encompass state programs
which directly contravene the central purpose of federal legislation by exclud-
ing a considerable segment of the class intended to be favored, while leaving
them in "unsuitable" homes. The Secretary's denial of funds to states operat-
ing under such programs would thus appear to be a proper area for discretion-
ary action. Further, such action would probably not be regarded by a court as
an abuse of this discretion.
Though his discretion under Title IV has never been tested, federal courts
construing structurally similar titles of the Social Security Act have required
only "a rational basis" for the Secretary's action in order to sustain withdrawal
of approval from state plans.3' One of these cases held that the state must show
either that the Secretary relied on an unconstitutional statute, or that the Act
affirmatively required his approval of that type of plan.32 It would appear un-
25. See note 16 supra and statutes cited at note 11 supra.
26. DEPr. OF H., E. & W. REP. 34.
27. The Act requires that the child be living with one of a designated class of relatives,
49 Stat. 629 (1935), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 606(a) (1958), and also permits states to
impose a residency requirement of up to one year, 49 Stat. 627 (1935), as amended, 42
U.S.C. § 602(b) (1958). See Meredith v. Ray, 292 Ky. 326, 166 S.W.2d 437 (1942) (up-
holding the reasonableness of the former).
28. See cases cited at note 23 supra.
29. S. REP. No. 628, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 35-36 (1935).
30. It has been held, however, that a state may not justify discrimination between
members of a class on the basis of economy. Collins v. State Bd. of Social Welfare, 248
Iowa 369, 377-78, 81 N.W.2d 4, 9 (1957).
31. Indiana ex rel. Bd. of Pub. Welfare v. Ewing, 99 F. Supp. 734 (D.D.C. 1951);
cf. Arizona cx rel. Bd. of Pub. Welfare v. Hobby, 221 F.2d 498 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
32. Arizona ex re. Bd. of Pub. Welfare v. Hobby, mpra note 31.
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likely that such a burden could be met here, in view of the courts' deference
to the Secretary's interpretation of his own function, and consequent refusal to
interfere with that interpretation "if there is a rational basis for it." Conse-
quently, though no aspect of the "suitable home" provisions is mentioned in
the Act as either a necessary or prohibited criterion, the numerous standards
which are specifically required 33 together with the grant of authority to the
Secretary to reject plans which fail to meet those standards,3 4 should be suffi-
cient to provide a "rational basis" for the present ruling. While the Secretary's
decision thus appears insulated from successful challenge, the widespread con-
troversy over the grant of Title IV benefits to illegitimate children 35 suggests
that Congress may well wish to enact legislation reversing the result of that
ruling.
Perhaps the simplest method by which Congress could attempt to reverse
the effect of the recent ruling would be to declare that the Secretary's discre-
tion is not to extend to the rejection of state plans on the ground that they
contain eligibility requirements repugnant to the purposes of Title IV, except
where those requirements violate some specific prohibition contained in the
Act. A claimant barred by a state "suitable home" provision would, after pas-
sage of such a congressional declaration, seek review of the denial in either
state or federal court. A first line of attack on state eligibility requirements
would be a charge that the state statutes violate the purposes of the federal act
and are therefore inoperative as a matter of statutory construction. Such an
attack presupposes that state plans must conform to the purposes contained
in the federal legislation. The states might argue, however, that in light of the
broad responsibility given them for the administration of Title IV funds, to-
gether with their complete control over the receipt and processing of applica-
tions,3 6 the only federal statutory requirements which state plans must meet
are those specifically set out in the federal act. But such an argument is un-
likely to succeed. The entire program grows out of an act of Congress, and
the Supreme Court has validated congressional grants to states conditioned
upon compliance with federal standards.3r Furthermore, extensive supervisory
powers have been placed in the hands of a federal agency 38 and the statute
itself is introduced by a "purposes" section pursuant to which the courts must
evaluate claimants' rights.39 Thus, though no court has squarely passed on the
33. See note 8 supra.
34. 49 Stat. 628 (1935), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 604 (1958) (authority to stop pay-
ments upon a finding of non-compliance, even though "plan" previously approved).
35. See, e.g., Roney, Report of the Advisory Council on Public Assistance, S. Doc.
No. 93, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 101-05 (1960) ; Carlson, Illegitimacy ... Who Pays? (collec-
tion of articles which appeared in the Hartford Courant, beginning April 3, 1960).
36. The Act provides that when a state plan has "approved" status, payments are made
on the basis of estimated need; thereafter states need only keep and file records concern-
ing actual expenditures. 49 Stat. 628 (1935), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 603(b) (1958).
37. See, e.g., Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 593-98 (1937).
38. See note 3 supra.
39. See note 21 supra.
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issue, it appears correct to say that since the states are administering federal
funds, they are operating within the framework of a federal act, and must
therefore conform to its purposes.
Should a court, however, accept the state's position that the federal purpose,
as a result of the congressional declaration, no longer prevents constitutional
"suitable home" provisions, it would be compelled to measure the state provi-
sions against the requirements of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. At the time of its passage, some doubt was expressed as to
whether the equal protection clause invalidated all statutory classification.40
But Supreme Court holdings soon made clear that states remained free to
treat different things differently; the equal protection clause required only that
classifications made by states be "reasonable." 41 That reasonableness may be
measured by a variety of standards is apparent from subsequent judicial appli-
cations of the clause. One group of cases clearly indicates that distinctions
based on race, national origin, and similar conditions of birth or status are at
best highly "suspect. '42 Characterized as "constitutionally irrelevant," they
have been upheld only where the governmental interest involved is shown to
be of the highest order.43 Furthermore, where a statute, unobjectionable on its
face, in fact discriminates in terms of one of the "suspect" classifications-
either through its necessarily discriminatory effect or through arbitrary ad-
ministration-the court will find a denial of equal protection.4 4 Finally, as
the long line of decisions invalidating state statutes which single out Negroes
for special treatment demonstrates, some classifications are regarded by the
court as per se violations of the equal protection clause.
45
40. Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REv.
341, 343-44 (1949) (citing cases) [hereinafter cited as Tussman & tenBroek].
41. Ibid.
42. E.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) ; Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (dictum) ; Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943) ;
Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 303-04 (1944) ; id. at 307-08 (concurring opinion) ; Taka-
hashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 420 (1948) ; Ohio ex rel. Clarke v. Decke-
bach, 274 U.S. 392 (1927) (dictum).
43. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1945); Hirabayashi v.
United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943) ; cf. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941)
(concurring opinion); Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552 (1947)
(dissenting opinion) ; Tussman & tenBroek 353-65.
44. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (rezoning operated so as to exclude
Negroes from voting status); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (broad statute
administered discriminatorily against Chinese subjects) ; cf. Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268
(1939) ; Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915) ; Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n,
334 U.S. 410, 422 (1948) (concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Murphy).
45. The suggestion here is not simply that prejudice against Negroes cannot itself be
the legislative purpose, but that even where such a classification bears some relationship
to a valid state objective it is inherently violative of equal protection and hence unconsti-
tutional. For a similar analysis with respect to classifications founded on blood relationship,
see the dissent of Mr. Justice Rutledge in Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Comm'rs,
330 U.S. 552, 565-66 (1947). Such a view seems implicit in the recent rejection by the
Supreme Court of the "separate but equal" provisions of state education statutes, Brown
v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and is made explicit by several commentators
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A second line of cases has applied a test verbalized in terms of the require-
ment that those similarly situated must be similarly treated.46 "Similarly situ-
ated" cannot, of course, mean only that everyone within the statutory class
possess the trait on the basis of which the classification is made; such a tauto-
logical requirement would render all challenged legislation, if effectively ad-
ministered, self-validating. 47 In these cases, rather, reasonableness is evaluated
in terms of purpose; classification is reasonable if it treats alike all those
similarly situated with regard to the purposes of the statute.
48 Unlike cases
involving "suspect" classifications, therefore, the issue is not whether the legis-
lature could ever segregate a particular class, but only whether it is reasonable
to do so for purposes of the legislation in question. In Smith v. Cahoon 
4 9 the
Florida legislature exempted carriers of farm products and certain seafoods
from a statute requiring security from carriers for hire to cover injuries caused
by their negligence. A claim that the equal protection clause had been violated
was upheld, not on the basis that carriers of farm produce could never be given
special treatment by the legislature, not because the classification was an in-
herently suspect one, but on the ground that such special treatment could not
be afforded in the context of a statute purporting to protect the public against
negligent carriers. °
Perhaps because the equal protection clause has been invoked in more than
one type of case,51 there have been few attempts explicitly to provide a rationale
following that decision. See, e.g., Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional
Law, in PRINCIPLES, POLITICS, & FUNDAMENTAL LAW 3 (1961); Black, The Lawfulness
of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421 (1960). The development of the doctrine
of the Brown case, traced in 2 EmERSON & HABER, POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE
UNITED STATES 1321-29 (2d ed. 1958), plus judicial treatment of later attempts to avoid
that decision, see James v. Almond, 170 F. Supp. 331, 337-38 (E.D. Va. 1959) ; Bush v.
Orleans Parish School Bd., 187 F. Supp. 42 (E.D. La. 1960), seem to provide support for
the commentators, as do decisions in the federal courts concerning segregation in areas
other than education. See, e.g., City of Greensboro v. Simkins, 246 F.2d 425 (4th Cir. 1957) ;
City of St. Petersburg v. Alsup, 238 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1956). The Supreme Court's affirm-
ance of classification of persons of Japanese ancestry during World War II, Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) ; Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943),
raises the question whether similar indulgence would be exercised should classification of
Negroes become related to some compelling national or state interest (e.g., war with
Africa).
46. E.g., Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31-32 (1885) ; Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U.S.
553 (1931) ; cf. Tussman & tenBroek 344-46; as applied to the Aid to Dependent Children
Act, see Collins v. State Bd. of Social Welfare, 248 Iowa 369, 81 N.W.2d 4 (1957). But
cf. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. v. May, 194 U.S. 267 (1904).
47. See Tussman & tenBroek 345.
48. Id. at 346.
49. 283 U.S. 553 (1931).
50. Id. at 567. The only Supreme Court case involving invalidation of an economic
regulation on equal protection grounds in more recent years is Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S.
457 (1957), in which the Court reiterates the requirement that classification be related to
purpose. It is at least arguable, however, that the classification in that case was so related.
51. For discussion of an instance where the Supreme Court appears to have confused
the two types, see Tussman & tenBroek 374-75.
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for its use. One such attempt, enunciated by Mr. Justice Jackson, concurring
in Railway Express v. New York,52 treats equal protection as a more flexible
judicial tool than the due process clause-a tool which may be used to invali-
date a statute while avoiding a holding that the area is one in which the state
is entirely without power to legislate. Thus, the effect of a finding of equal pro-
tection denial can always be avoided by expanding the challenged classifica-
tion, or by altering the purpose of the act so as to make the original classifica-
tion reasonable. In either event, the result of such a change would be to subject
the legislature to greater political pressure, either because more people would
be affected or because a hitherto concealed purpose would then become evi-
dent.63 Jackson's rationale for use of the equal protection clause, therefore,
seems based on its prophylactic potentialities; it is a means by which the Court
can invoke the pressures of the political processes in cases where it is hesitant
to use the more nearly absolute prohibitions of the due process clause.
Where categories based on "constitutional irrelevancies" are involved, how-
ever, the Railway Express rationale seems inappropriate. For even if the legis-
lation in question were to be approved by political processes, such groupings,
as well as classifications which courts find so arbitrary as to rest on no rational
foundation,5 4 not only represent a denial of equal protection but also con-
travene due process requirements. Such categories are found to deny equal
protection, in other words, because they reflect a discriminatory legislative
purpose which itself contravenes the due process clause-a constitutional judg-
ment of lack of legislative power which no degree of political approval can
alter. Consequently, Mr. Justice Jackson's rationale is applicable only where a
widening of the challenged category operates to remove the suspect classifica-
tion entirely from the statute.
In cases where the constitutional objection is framed in terms of the failure
of classification to relate to purpose, on the other hand, the Railway Express
rationale is more clearly applicable. What Jackson's analysis illumines are
the policy objectives served by the apparently fruitless procedure of voiding a
legislative classification, in cases where the state legislature can effectively
achieve an identical discrimination simply by amending the purpose clause of
the statute. Barring the possibility of oversight, 5 the most plausible explana-
tion for a legislature's use of classifications unrelated to purpose would appear
to be an attempt to utilize a statute having one set of purposes as a vehicle for
52. 336 U.S. 106, 111-17 (1949).
53. Id. at 113-15.
54. See, e.g., American Communication Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 417 (1950) (con-
curring opinion) ; Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934) ; Skinner v. Oklahoma ex
rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) ; Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 184-85 (1941)
(concurring opinion).
55. See, e.g., Ronson Patents Corp. v. Sparklets Devices, Inc., 102 F. Supp. 123 (E.D.
Mo. 1951); Johnson v. United States Gypsum Co., 217 Ark. 264, 229 S.W.2d 671 (1950) ;
Pressman v. State Tax Comm'n, 204 Md. 78, 102 A.2d 821 (1954); State v. Louisville &
N.R.R., 97 Miss. 35, 53 So. 454 (1910).
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achieving discriminations based on wholly different criteria-an attempt which
strongly suggests that the concealed purpose is either unpopular or of dubious
legality. Thus, even where such concealed purposes are clearly within the
sphere of legislative powers, Mr. Justice Jackson seems correct in expecting
invocation of the political processes to result in at least sober reconsideration
and very possibly a failure to re-enact the challenged legislation.56 Democratic
politics, furthermore, presupposes the framing of policy issues in terms suffi-
ciently clear to enable the electorate intelligently to judge them, and such
clarity is impossible of achievement unless statutory classifications accurately
reflect the purposes of the legislation in which they are embodied.
Judicial awareness of political realities will, of course, limit this use of the
equal protection clause. State legislatures are not permanent bodies,"7 and the
pressures of time are such that they can give only intermittent attention to any
specific problem.58 Many problems, furthermore, can effectively be dealt with
only on an ad hoc basis. As a result, a considerable amount of legislative dis-
cretion has been recognized by the courts as necessary for effective govern-
ment." Deference to such considerations is especially appropriate where the
legislature is embarking upon an experimental economic or social policy. 60 But
such arguments seem less persuasive when a statute is challenged on the ground
that it infringes civil liberties, an area in which courts have a particular ex-
pertise, not necessarily shared by the legislature. Especially in such cases, there-
fore, Railway Express provides a rationale justifying invocation of the equal
protection clause in terms which ultimately rest on the basic requirement of
democratic political ideology that important questions of policy be decided by
the political processes.
An evaluation of the Louisiana "suitable home" provisions serves to illus-
trate both applications of the equal protection clause. Since the group excluded
by the new eligibility tests is overwhelmingly non-white, 61 a court might well
conclude that the statute operates in a discriminatory fashion. Unlike analogous
cases, however, in which the Supreme Court could find no valid state interest
being served by the legislation in question, 62 it is possible that such purposes
as economy and an increase in the general level of morality would prove suffi-
56. Railway Express v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112-13 (1949).
57. See ZELLER, AMERICAN STATE LEGISLATURES 65-66 (1954).
58. See HART & SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIc PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND
APPLICATION OF LAW 742-43 (Tent. ed. 1958).
59. Cf. Comment, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA.
L. REv. 67, 89 n.112 (1960).
60. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Tussman & tenBroek
372-73; Hetherington, State Economic Regulation and Siubstantive Due Process of Law,
53 Nw. U.L. Rrv. 13 (1958); Comment, 18 OHIO ST. L.J. 384 (1957); but cf. Morey v.
Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957).
61. See note 18 supra.
62. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 342 (1960). Cf. Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S.
268 (1939) ; Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915). The view has on occasion been
expressed that even where a valid interest is shown, the Supreme Court should look to the
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cient in this instance to survive the scrutiny necessitated by the operational
effects of the statute. In such event, the fact that the excluded group was pre-
dominantly non-white would not alone appear sufficient to provide a basis on
which to hold the provisions violative of equal protection. But the statute also
classifies children on the basis of illegitimacy. Legitimacy is a condition of birth
wholly beyond the individual's control, and at least one former justice of the
Supreme Court declared himself unable to differentiate between discrimination
based on race and that based on blood relationship.63 On the other hand, given
the long history of discrimination against bastards, as in inheritance statutes,64
it seems unlikely that the Court will adopt as rigid an approach to classifica-
tions based on legitimacy as that which has characterized its position with
regard to legislation directed against Negroes. Nevertheless, the nature of the
illegitimacy classification strongly suggests that it might be considered "sus-
pect" by the Court, thus compelling "the most rigid scrutiny" to insure that its
use in a statute is not only related to but in a significant sense is required by a
pressing public purpose( 5
Even if a court failed to invalidate "suitable home" provisions on the ground
that "suspect" classifications are involved, it is doubtful that the Louisiana
statutes could survive an equal protection attack based on the requirement that
classifications be related to declared legislative purpose. Children in both "suit-
able" and "unsuitable" homes would appear to be similarly situated with re-
gard to the congressional purpose of providing economic aid for dependent
children. 6 Consequently, suitability of home criteria in any state statutes may
be regarded as establishing classifications unrelated to purpose, whether or not
the laws single out illegitimates or operate harshly against one race. Since the
purpose being contravened is contained in federal legislation rather than in a
state enactment, a judicial determination that the equal protection clause had
been violated could not be avoided except by conforming the purposes of state
eligibility requirements to those contained in the federal act.
If a court wished to avoid the drastic remedy of constitutional invalidation,
but regarded the case as one calling for an exercise of the judicial function
described above-that of subjecting "hidden" purposes to political processes-
it might apply an alternative theory under which the same result could be
achieved. In Kent v. Dulles 67 and Greene v. McElroy,68 plaintiffs challenged
federal administrative action taken under broad grants of power from Congress.
underlying discrimination and strike it down. Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Comm'rs,
330 U.S. 552, 565-66 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting) ; Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n,
334 U.S. 410 (1948) (semble) (see Tussman & tenBroek 374-75).
63. Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Comm'rs, supra note 62.
64. The conditions under which an illegitimate child can inherit in each of the fifty
states are set out in DEPT. oF H., E. & W. REP. 67-71.
65. See, e.g., Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) ; Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) ; Ohio ex rel. Clarke v. Deckebach, 274 U.S. 392 (1927).
66. See text at note 33 supra.
67. 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
68. 360 U.S. 474 (1959).
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The State Department had denied Kent a passport on the ground of suspected
Communist affiliation ;69 Greene was deprived of security clearance-and con-
sequently lost his job-following a Defense Department hearing at which he
was denied the right to cross-examine his accusers.70 In both cases, the Su-
preme Court refused to consider the serious due process questions which were
presented, stating that the issue of congressional power to adopt such proce-
dures would be reached only after it had been made clear that Congress had in
fact exercised such power.71 The questioned administrative practices were of
long standing, and well within the scope of the legislative and executive authori-
zations under which they had been promulgated.7 2 Congress, furthermore, not
only made no attempt to interfere with them, but had even indicated approval
through continued appropriations.73 The Court nevertheless held that passive
congressional acquiescence was insufficient to validate the challenged proce-
dures ;74 these holdings were not couched in terms of power, nor even of legis-
lative intent, but rather were based on the ground that in cases involving ad-
ministrative procedures of questionable constitutionality, authority must ex-
plicitly have been delegated by a body responsible to the electorate:
Without explicit action by lawmakers, decisions of great constitutional
import and effect would be relegated by default to administrators who,
under our system of government, are not endowed with authority to decide
them.
75
In imposing a requirement that policy decisions potentially involving consti-
tutional violations must explicitly be made by a body directly responsible to the
electorate, the Court, though it clothes its decision in the garments of "delega-
tion," is in fact adopting a rationale closely analogous to that which underlies
the equal protection cases discussed in connection with Railway Express.70
Extension of this "delegation" doctrine to comprehend the situation pre-
sented by "suitable home" provisions might be possible owing to certain struc-
tural similarities between the exercise of state authority under Title IV and
the federal administrative actions challenged in Greene and Kent. The Aid to
Dependent Children program was created by Congress. It involves the expendi-
ture of federal funds, which are turned over to the states with only general in-
69. 357 U.S. at 117-18.
70. 360 U.S. at 478-82.
71. Id. at 507-08; 357 U.S. at 129-30. Cf. Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 303 (1944).
But see Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 121 (1959).
72. For a full discussion of the administrative practices involved, and their foundations
in legislation and executive orders, see the dissents by Mr. justice Clark, in Greene v.
McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 516-23 (1959), and in Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 130-41 (1958).
73. Ibid.
74. 360 U.S. at 506-07; 357 U.S. at 124-25.
75. 360 U.S. at 507.
76. Cf. Jaffe, An Essay on Delegation of Legislative Power: I, 47 CoLum. L. REv.
359, 360-61, 369-71 (1947); Bickel & Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial
Process: The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARv. L. REv. 1, 31-34 (1957) ; Comment, The Void-
for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67 (1960).
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dications as to the purposes to be served and means to be used in administra-
tion,77 and certain states have propounded regulations governing distribution
which raise serious constitutional questions. Within the context of this pro-
gram, therefore, the states-given their role as administrators--could be viewed
as "agencies" of the federal government. But a "delegation" approach might
nevertheless appear inappropriate, since "suitable home" provisions themselves
are the product of legislative action, and thus directly traceable to elected offi-
cials. On the other hand, the fact that the funds involved are federal might be
sufficient to persuade a court that it is only Congress-representative of the
entire electorate from which the funds are procured-which is competent to
delegate authority concerning eligibility requirements.78 On this basis, since
constitutionally questionable requirements are involved, use of the Greene and
Kent approach would be proper.
In light of the statutory and constitutional problems discussed above, re-
moval of the Secretary's discretion by Congress would appear insufficient to
permit judicial validation of "suitable home" provisions such as those adopted
by Louisiana. Congress might therefore wish to amend the present Act by
specifically incorporating such eligibility tests.79 In such event, neither statu-
tory construction nor "delegation" challenges would be appropriate, since Con-
gress would explicitly have spoken. Further, though the classifications would
be no more related to purpose when enacted by Congress, the literal constitu-
tional context would be different owing to the lack of an equal protection clause
in the fifth amendment. In cases involving "suspect" classifications, federal
regulations can be overturned on due process grounds.80 Thus, if illegitimacy
is regarded as a "suspect" classification, even a federal enactment would at least
be subjected to "rigid scrutiny." And dicta in several cases seem to suggest
that the due process clause of the fifth amendment may incorporate the full
range of equal protection constraints 811-a doctrine which would permit courts
to impose on Congress the requirement of relationship between classification
and legislative purpose.
Assuming arguendo that a congressional "suitable home" test would be un-
constitutional within the framework of the present Social Security Act, Con-
gress might nevertheless attempt to achieve the same result by passing a new
act, not having as its purpose aid to dependent children, but specifically directed
77. See 49 Stat. 628 (1935), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 603 (1958) ; 49 Stat. 627 (1935),
as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 602 (1958).
78. For a case involving a similar argument with respect to the relationship between
members of a congressional subcommittee and Congress as a whole, see Watkins v. United
States, 354 U.S. 178, 201-02 (1957).
79. It may well be, of course, that political pressures would prevent such an enact-
ment by Congress. But it is precisely this type of pressure which the Railway Express
rationale seeks to invoke.
80. See, e.g., Bolling v. Sharp, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
81. Ibid. See United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 8 (1947) ; Tussman & tenBroek
363. But see Detroit Bank v. United States, 317 U.S. 329, 337-38 (1943) ; Currin v. Wal-
lace, 306 U.S. 1, 14 (1939).
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towards the regulation of morality.82 Such an enactment might present a new
set of constitutional questions concerning the proper limits of federal legislative
power,8 3 but it would at least explicitly reveal the motivating legislative pur-
pose, and could thus be subjected to effective public scrutiny. Hopefully, fur-
thermore, both state and federal legislatures might be persuaded to confine
future attempts to regulate morality to programs which more clearly avoid
potential equal protection violations. Accommodation-so necessary in a gov-
ernment containing three co-ordinate powers-would in that event have re-
placed the necessity for an ultimate test of strength between the judicial and
legislative branches. That the Railway Express rationale for invocation of the
equal protection clause promises to contribute to such a development seems a
compelling argument in favor of its acceptance.
82. A first step in this direction may already have been taken. See note 32 supra.
83. See generally Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 CoLUm. L.
REv. 489, 525-28 (1954) ; Huard, State Sovereignty ad Federal Subsidies, 46 GEo. L.J.
459, 467 (1958) ; Note, 55 CoLISu. L. REv. 83 (1955).
